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Abstract:
Side-channel information is any type of information leaked through unexpected channels
due to physical features of a system dealing with data. The memory cache can be used as
a side-channel, leakage and exploitation of side-channel information from the executing
processes is possible, leading to the recovery of secret information. Cache-based side-
channel attacks represent a serious threat to implementations of several cryptographic
primitives, especially in shared libraries.
This work explains some of the cache-timing techniques commonly used to exploit
vulnerable software. Using a particular combination of techniques and exploiting a vul-
nerability found in the implementation of the DSA signature scheme in the OpenSSL
shared library, a cache-timing attack is performed against the DSA’s sliding window ex-
ponentiation algorithm.
Moreover, the attack is expanded to show that it is possible to perform cache-timing
attacks against protocols relying on the DSA signature scheme. SSH and TLS are at-
tacked, leading to a key-recovery attack: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-
bit DSA hostkey from an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a
2048/256-bit DSA key from an stunnel server.
Keywords: applied cryptography; digital signatures; side-channel analysis; timing at-
tacks; cache-timing attacks; DSA; OpenSSL
CERCS Code: : P170 (Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control)
Vahema¨lu ajastuse tehnikad: DSA algoritmi rakendus
Kokkuvo˜te:
Ku¨lgkanali informatsioon on igat tu¨u¨pi info, mis lekib andmeid to¨o¨tleva su¨steemi fu¨u¨siliste
eripa¨rade to˜ttu. Vahema¨lu on u¨ks vo˜imalik ku¨lgkanal, kust vo˜ib lekkida andmeid ta¨idetava
protsessi kohta, muuhulgas vo˜ivad lekked vo˜imaldada salajase informatsiooni taastamist.
Vahema¨lu ku¨lgkanali ru¨nded on to˜sine oht kru¨ptograafiliste primitiivide teostuses, eriti
kui vead esinevad jagatud teekides. Ka¨esolev to¨o¨ tutvustab mo˜ningaid sagedaselt kasuta-
tavaid vahema¨lu ajastuse ru¨ndeid. Muuhulgas demonstreerib to¨o¨ DSA algoritmi teostuse
no˜rkust OpenSSL teegis. Vahema¨lu ajastuse ru¨nne on suunatud DSA algoritmi libiseva
aknaga astendamise algoritmi vastu. Lisaks na¨idatakse, kuidas seda ru¨nnet laiemalt ka-
sutada erinevate protokollide vastu, mis DSA algoritmi vajavad. SSH ja TLS-i ru¨nded
vo˜imaldavad taastada kasutatud vo˜tmeid. On vaja 260 SSH-2 ka¨tlust, et saada teada
1024/160-bitine DSA vo˜ri OpenSSH serverist ning 580 TLS 1.2 ka¨tlust, et ekstraheerida
2048/256-bitiseid DSA vo˜tmeid stunnel serverist.
Ma¨rkso˜na: rakenduslik kru¨ptograafia, digitaalallkiri, ku¨lgkanali ru¨nne, ajastuse ru¨nded,
vahema¨lu ajastuse ru¨nded, DSA, OpenSSL
CERCS Code: : P170 (Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control)
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AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AMD Advanced Micro Devices
API Application Programming Interface
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IP Internet Protocol
icache instruction cache
KB Kilobyte, 1024 bytes
KEX Key Exchange
L1 First Level Cache
L2 Second Level Cache
LFU Least Frequently Used
LLC Last Level Cache
LRU Least Recently Used
LSB Least Significant Bit
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRU Most Recently Used
MSB Most Significant Bit
NAF Non-Adjacent Form
NP Nearest Plane
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman public key cryptosystem
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SHA-256 Secure Hash Algorithm 2, 256 bits variant
SHA-512 Secure Hash Algorithm 2, 512 bits variant
SM Square and Multiply
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SMT Simultaneous Multi-Threading
SSH Secure Shell
SWE Sliding Window Exponentiation
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
VQ Vector Quantization
X11 X Window System
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1 Introduction
Often there is a big gap between theoretical and applied cryptography due to the prob-
lems of translating the theoretical security proofs to real world software and hardware
implementations. On one hand, theorists define and prove in paper the strong security of
cryptographic primitives and protocols. On the other hand, engineers have to implement
cryptography that is strongly secure and efficient at the same time. Unfortunately, it
is hard to find middle ground where strong security of actual implementations can be
proved.
In order for cryptographic primitives to be standardized, they must prove strong
theoretical security and resistance to known cryptanalytic techniques such as linear and
differential cryptanalysis, but as it is in the world of cryptography, theoretical security
is based on the assumptions about the power and abilities that an adversary has. These
abilities are, at least in paper, powerful enough to cover a strong adversary. Unfortunately
when the cryptographic primitives are implemented in software, the adversaries acquire
new and unexpected abilities that were never considered from a theoretical perspective.
Cryptanalysis is one important branch in cryptology, which is the science of ana-
lyzing and breaking cryptographic primitives and protocols. Traditional cryptanalytic
techniques try to break the security of primitives and protocols by studying them from
a purely mathematical point of view, isolated from the system in which they are im-
plemented and executed. However, it is far from being a complete approach since the
systems where cryptography is executed plays an important role to determine its security.
Cryptographic primitives are built, most of the time, using well known components
that are easy to implement or using predefined instructions tailored specifically for the
microprocessors in which they are running. The fact that cryptographic primitives de-
pend on multiple layers and components makes it hard to guarantee the security of the
software implementations and often this leads to serious vulnerabilities. The analysis of
the information leaked from the software and hardware components is called side-channel
analysis.
Side-channel analysis is a cryptanalytic technique born from practice. Original side-
channel timing analysis, and the most well known technique in this area, was first dis-
cussed by Kocher [30] back in 1996. This technique understands and derives private
information from the side-channel information collected from physical power analysis.
The main goal of side-channel attacks is to obtain complete or partial information of the
internal state of a system by measuring and analyzing physical properties—e.g. power
consumption, time, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic emanation and temperature vari-
ation.
A type of side-channel analysis focused on software implementations, is timing attacks.
Timing attacks exploit timing information leaked from software implementations that do
not run in constant time, thus by measuring the time it takes for an algorithm to complete,
an attacker can deduce information that otherwise should be secret.
The main topic of this thesis is a specific type of timing attack that exploits the
caching components commonly found in modern microprocessors. Cache-timing attacks
exploit the availability of data in the cache, then the information is correlated to the
running cryptographic algorithm to finally achieve secret key recovery.
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1.1 Motivation
Digital signatures are essential for data authentication, thus attacking this cryptographic
primitive allows malicious parties to authenticate any data they want. Digital signatures
are a cryptographic building block and side-channel resistant algorithms must be used to
ensure the security and authentication of the communications in the Internet.
The work presented here is motivated by the ongoing and young field of research trying
to exploit leakage of side-channel information to mount key recovery attacks against
hardware and software implementations of cryptographic primitives.
Side-channel information leakage is hard to detect by software developers as it requires
a high level of expertise about the techniques and the system hardware underneath.
Additionally, tests used to discover or detect side-channel information leakage are not
part of the standard developer practices and therefore is hard to detect these types of
vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, side-channel attacks represent a serious and immediate
threat to the security of Internet.
Moreover, using well known open source and audited cryptographic libraries is a two-
edged sword — as it is shown in this work. On one hand, vulnerabilities are reduced by
having many people auditing the code. On the other hand if a vulnerability is found, it
affects all the software depending on that library.
1.2 Goals
This thesis work focuses in detailing current cache-timing techniques used to exploit
software implementations of cryptographic primitives.
Moreover, the work presented here serves the following purposes:
• To summarize the categorization of implementation attacks and define side-channel
attacks.
• To define cache-timing attacks and explain current techniques used to exploit this
type of attack.
• To show what small defects in software implementing cryptographic primitives can
do to the security of communications.
• To demonstrate that cache-timing attacks are practical and they represent a real
threat for the Internet users.
The ultimate goal is to demonstrate that software implementation of constant-time
cryptographic primitives is not a trivial task to do and small software defects may intro-
duce serious vulnerabilities that might go unnoticed for very long periods of time.
1.3 Author’s Contributions
The work presented in this document started as an overview and analysis of side-channel
attacks and then evolved into a cache-timing attack implementation, exploiting a software
defect in the OpenSSL implementation of the DSA algorithm. Several sections of Chap-
ter 5 and Chapter 6 presented here are a collaborative work among researchers at Aalto
University, Tampere University of Technology and University of Adelaide. Therefore, the
wording in those chapters is switched to the plural form. The author of this work made
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several contributions to the collaborative work, including timing-measurement process,
spy process, protocol client, software fix, responsible disclosure.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the background information fun-
damental to understand cache-timing attacks, the topics presented include cryptography
and protocols relevant for this work, the memory hierarchy, covert channels and catego-
rization of implementation attacks. Chapter 3 goes deeper into cache-timing attacks by
explaining some of the techniques used to exploit and analyze cache side-channel infor-
mation. Chapter 4 discusses related publications relevant to cache-timing attacks and
relevant to this work in general. Chapter 5 demonstrates how a software defect introduced
in OpenSSL’s DSA code allowed to exploit both, the DSA algorithm and the protocols
using it. Chapter 6 shows the results of the experiments performed during this work.
Chapter 7 discuses challenges, mitigation techniques, disclosure of the vulnerability and
future work. Chapter 8 examines the outcome and the lessons learned in this work. Ap-
pendix A contains the code provided to OpenSSL, LibreSSL and BoringSSL to fix the
software defect.
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2 Background
This chapter summarizes the background information, concepts, algorithms and tech-
niques used during the analysis, development and evaluation of the present work. Sec-
tion 2.1 discusses signature schemes. Section 2.2 explains the discrete logarithm (DL)
problem and the assumptions associated to the problem for digital signature schemes.
Section 2.3 explains in detail the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) signature scheme —
parameter generation, key generation, signing and verification. Section 2.4 explains the
Sliding Window Exponentiation (SWE) algorithm used in DSA to compute exponentia-
tions with modular arithmetic. Section 2.5 briefly explains the communication protocols
exploited in this work, detailing the information relevant for the cache-timing attack.
Section 2.6 gives an overview of the memory hierarchy and additionally, it mentions some
features fundamental for understanding cache-timing attacks. Section 2.7 defines the con-
cept of covert channels and explains the cache as a covert channel. Finally, Section 2.8
discusses the categorization of cryptographic attacks.
2.1 Digital Signature Schemes
Digital signature schemes are the digital analogue to handwritten signatures and their
main goal is to provide authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation. In the case of
digital communications, an important use of digital signatures is to provide authentication
and integrity of messages between two communicating parties. Typically, this is done
through the use of cryptographic algorithms. Such algorithms use randomness and public-
private key pairs to sign and verify messages.
As in handwritten signatures, the digital signatures should be impossible to fake if
private information of the signature is never revealed — such as position, grip and color.
A digital signature scheme consists of four algorithms:
• A domain parameter generation algorithm that generates the set D of required
parameters for the scheme.
• A key generation algorithm that takes as input the parameters D and generates
the public-private key pairs (y, α).
• A signature generation algorithm that takes as input the set D, private key α and
message m. Outputs a signature Σ.
• A signature verification algorithm that takes as inputs the set D, public key y,
message m and signature Σ and accepts or rejects the signature.
Assuming the set of parameters D and the public key y are valid, the signature veri-
fication algorithm always accepts if Σ is generated by the signature generation algorithm
using the appropriate parameters.
Ideally, a digital signature scheme must be secure. Security is difficult to define
since it is a function of the goals desired to achieve. Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest
(GMR) [21] offer a strong security definition for digital signatures, such definition states
that a signature scheme is said to be GMR-secure if it exists an adversary who can obtain
digital signatures for messages of its choice from a signer and still it is unable to forge a
signature for any new message for which it has not already requested previously.
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2.1.1 Domain Parameters
Public domain parameters are a set of parameters (p, q, g) associated with a key-pair and
these parameters are used in signature or encryption schemes. Domain parameters are
called public because generally they are shared by many entities, and depending on the
application and implementation, they may be specific to each entity. The parameters
should be, and generally they are, chosen in a mathematical group where the discrete
logarithm problem and the associated mathematical assumptions are hard to break.
In general, Hankerson et al. [25] [P. 9 Sec 1.2.2] define the parameters as follows:
• p is a prime integer.
• q is a prime divisor of p− 1.
• g ∈ [1, p − 1] is a generator of order q, where q is the smallest positive integer
satisfying gq = 1 (mod p).
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure to generate correct domain parameters.
Algorithm 1: DL domain parameter generation
Input: Security parameters l, t.
Result: DL domain parameters (p, q, g)
1 begin
2 p← l-bit prime;
3 q ← t-bit prime such that q divides p− 1
4 h← [1, p− 1]
5 g ← h(p−1)/q mod p
6 while g = 1 do
7 h← [1, p− 1]
8 g ← h(p−1)/q mod p
9 return(p, q, g)
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem and Related Problems
The security of all discrete logarithm (DL) schemes — such as ElGamal and DSA, is
based in the DL problem. The hardness of this number-theoretical problem has proved
to be essential for the security of public-key cryptographic schemes and therefore, allowing
secure communications on the Internet.
The DL problem defined over multiplicative cyclic groups states that given a mul-
tiplicative cyclic group G, a generator g of the group and an element h ∈ G, find the
integer α ∈ G such that gα = h. The integer α is the discrete logarithm of h to the base
g, or more commonly defined as α = logg h.
The hardness of the DL problem provides some level of security for the cryptographic
schemes but it is not sufficient, for that reason, additional assumptions related to the DL
problem are used to prove the security of different cryptographic schemes.
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2.2.1 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption states that for a cyclic group
G of order q, given a triplet (g, ga, gb) for a randomly chosen generator g and random
integers a, b ∈ {0, ..., q − 1} it is computationally intractable to compute gab.
2.2.2 Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption states that given two elements
ga, gb for independent uniformly chosen a, b ∈ Zq, the integer gab is computationally
indistinguishable from gc for a randomly and independently chosen c ∈ Zq.
Choosing the correct security parameters described in Section 2.1.1 prevents known
attacks on cryptographic schemes based on the DL problem, CDH assumption and DDH
assumption.
2.3 The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme [19],
DSA was first proposed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). DSA uses the multiplicative group of a finite field. This work uses the following
notation for the DSA.
2.3.1 DSA Parameters
Primes p, q such that q divides (p− 1), a generator g of multiplicative order q in GF (p)
and an approved hash function h — e.g. SHA-1, SHA-256.
2.3.2 DSA Private-Public Key Pairs
The private key α is an integer uniformly chosen such that 0 < α < q and the corre-
sponding public key y is given by y = gα mod p. Calculating the private key given the
public key requires solving the DL problem and for correctly chosen parameters, this is
an intractable problem.
Algorithm 2 demonstrates the procedure for generating valid DSA key-pairs. Note
that this procedure generates only a key-pair therefore it should be performed by each of
the parties involved.
Algorithm 2: Key Generation for DSA
Input: DSA domain parameters (p, q, g).
Result: DSA key pair (α, y)
1 begin
2 α ∈R [1, q − 1] ;
3 y ← gα mod p
4 return(α, y)
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2.3.3 Signing
A given party, Alice, wants to send a signed message m to Bob — the message m is
not necessarily encrypted. Using her public-private key pair {αA, yA}, Alice performs
the Algorithm 3 to sign the message m and attaches the signature (r, s) to the original
message m. At the end Alice sends to Bob (m, r, s).
Algorithm 3: DSA Signature Generation
Input: Message m, private key αA, domain parameters (p, q, g), secure hash H.
Result: DSA signature (r, s)
1 begin
2 k ∈R [1, q − 1] ;
3 r ← (gk mod p) mod q ;
4 if r = 0 then
5 goto 1
6 h← H(m);
7 s← k−1(h+ αAr) mod q;
8 if s = 0 then
9 goto 1
10 return(m, r, s)
2.3.4 Verifying
Bob wants to be sure the message m he received comes from Alice — a valid signature
gives a strong evidence of authenticity. Bob performs the procedure in Algorithm 4 to
verify Alice’s signature.
Algorithm 4: DSA Signature Verification
Input: Message m, public key yA, domain parameters (p, q, g), secure hash H.
Result: Accept or Reject DSA signature.
1 begin
2 if 0 < r < q and 0 < s < q then
3 h← H(m);
4 w ← s−1 mod q;
5 u1 ← hw mod q;
6 u2 ← rw mod q;
7 r′ ← (gu1yu2A mod p) mod q ;
8 if r = r′ then
9 return Accept;
10 else
11 return Reject;
12 else
13 return Reject;
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2.3.5 DSA in Practice
Putting it mildly, there is no consensus on key sizes, and furthermore keys seen in the wild
and used in ubiquitous protocols have varying sizes—sometimes dictated by existing and
deployed standards. For example, NIST defines 1024-bit p with 160-bit q as “legacy-use”
and 2048-bit p with 256-bit q as “acceptable” [6]. This two parameter sets are the focus
on this work.
SSH’s Transport Layer Protocol1 lists DSA key type ssh-dss as “required” and defines
r and s as 160-bit integers, implying 160-bit q. In fact, the OpenSSH tool ssh-keygen
defaults to 160-bit q and 1024-bit p for these key types, not allowing the user to override
that option, and using the same parameters to generate the server’s host key. It is
worth noting that recently as of version 7.0, OpenSSH disables host server DSA keys
by a configurable default option2, but of course this does not affect already deployed
solutions.
As a countermeasure to previous timing attacks, OpenSSL’s DSA implementation
pads nonces by adding either q or 2q to k, the padding guarantees a fixed bit size exponent.
The claim is the following
gk = gk+q
= gk+2q
= gkgq
= gkg2q
The original signing algorithm computes r = (gk mod p) mod q, recall
h = [1, p− 1]
g = h(p−1)/q mod p
gq = h
q(p−1)
q mod p
= h(p−1) mod p
By Fermat’s little theorem,
h(p−1) mod p = 1 mod p
Therefore,
r = (gk mod p) mod q
= (gkgq mod p) mod q
= (gkg2q mod p) mod q
For the DSA signing algorithm, Step 2 is the performance bottleneck and the exponen-
tiation algorithm used will prove to be of extreme importance to later collect side-channel
information in Section 5.2.
Implementations that fail to produce random nonces or that reuse the nonce k, are
vulnerable to the recovery of the secret key. Given two different signatures (r, sA),
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253
2http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
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(r, sB) using the same secret nonce k, generated from two different messages — therefore
H(mA) 6= H(mB), it is possible to compute k as follows:
sA = k
−1(H(mA) + αr) mod q
sB = k
−1(H(mB) + αr) mod q
Subtracting the two signatures,
sA − sB = k−1(H(mA) + αr)− k−1(H(mB) + αr) mod q
= k−1(H(mA) + αr −H(mB)− αr) mod q
= k−1(H(mA)−H(mB)) mod q
Thus,
k =
(H(mA)−H(mB))
(sA − sB) mod q
Successfully recovering the nonce k using only two signatures. Now, once the nonce
k is known and given a signature (m, r, s), it is trivial to recover the secret key α using
the following formula.
α = r−1(sk −H(m)) mod q
2.4 DSA’s Sliding Window Exponentiation
Sliding window exponentiation (SWE) is a widely implemented software method to per-
form integer exponentiations — featured alongside other methods in the OpenSSL code-
base. SWE is fairly popular due to its performance since it reduces the amount of
pre-computation needed and, moreover, reduces the average amount of multiplications
performed during the exponentiation.
An exponent e is represented and processed as a sequence of windows ei, each of length
L(ei) bits. Processing the exponent in windows reduces the amount of multiplications at
the cost of increased memory utilization since a table of pre-computed values is used.
A window ei can be a zero window represented as a string of “0”s or non-zero window
represented as a string starting and ending with “1”s and such window is of width w —
determined in OpenSSL by the size in bits of the exponent e. The length of non-zero
windows satisfy 1 ≤ L(ei) ≤ w, thus the value of any given non-zero window is an odd
number between 1 and 2w − 1.
As mentioned before, the algorithm pre-computes values and stores them in a table to
be used later during multiplication operations. The multipliers computed are bv mod m
for each odd value of v where 1 ≤ v ≤ 2w − 1 and these values are stored in table index
g[i] where i = (v − 1)/2. For example, with the standard 160-bit q size, OpenSSL uses
a window width w = 4 and with the 256-bit key size OpenSSL uses a window width
w = 5. The algorithm pre-computes multipliers b1, b3, b5, ..., b15 mod m and stores them
in g[0], g[1], g[2], ..., g[7], respectively.
Using the sliding window representation of the exponent e, Algorithm 5 computes the
corresponding exponentiation through a combination of squares and multiplications in a
left-to-right approach. The algorithm scans every window ei from the most significant bit
(MSB) to the least significant bit (LSB).
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Algorithm 5: Sliding-window exponentiation.
Input: Window size w, base b, modulo m, N-bit exponent e represented as n
windows ei, each of length L(ei).
Output: be mod m.
1 // Pre-computation
2 g[0]← b mod m;
3 s← MULT(g[0], g[0]) mod m;
4 for j ← 1 to 2w−1 do
5 g[j]←MULT(g[j − 1], s) mod m;
6 // Exponentiation
7 r ← 1;
8 for i← n to 1 do
9 for j ← 1 to L(ei) do
10 r ←MULT(r, r) mod m;
11 if ei 6= 0 then r ←MULT(r, g[(ei − 1)/2]) mod m;
12 return r;
For any window, a square operation is executed for each bit and additionally for a
non-zero window, the algorithm executes an extra multiplication when it reaches the LSB
of the window.
For novel reasons explained later in Section 5.1, the side-channel part of this work
focuses on this algorithm. Specifically, in getting the sequence of squares and multiplies
(SM) performed during its execution. Then partial information extracted from the SM
sequence is later used in the lattice attack.
2.5 Protocols
The essence of Internet relies in the communication between two or several remote entities.
Some classic examples of the use of Internet include remote system administration, file
transfer, communication between clients and servers, banking services, etc. Nevertheless,
the Internet does not provide any security guarantee or data protection for the information
transmitted in it, and since it is na¨ıve to rely in the good faith of the entities involved in
each communication, security protocols were developed on top of the Internet to provide
information security.
Nowadays, communication protocols are assumed to be safe and secure to use in the
Internet but their security still depends on the security of their individual components,
which includes software libraries and cryptographic libraries — e.g. OpenSSL, LibreSSL,
BoringSSL.
Several communication protocols exist and are actively used on the Internet and new
protocols are developed every year but two of the most widely used, widespread and
relevant protocols for this work are TLS and SSH.
17
2.5.1 SSH
The SSH protocol3 is a packet-based binary protocol working on top of the transport
layer (e.g. TCP/IP) that provides secure login connections and secure file transfer over an
untrusted network. SSH uses cryptographic algorithms to implement four basic security
features: authentication, key exchange, encryption and integrity.
In SSH, at the beginning of every key exchange a random cookie is sent by both parties,
additionally in every transmitted packet, random padding and integrity protection data
are added at the end.
During the initial phase of communication both parties negotiate: the cipher algo-
rithms used for data encryption, the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms
used for data integrity, the key exchange (KEX) methods used for one-time session key
derivation, the public key algorithms for authentication and the compression algorithms
for data compression.
In general, the SSH protocol performs the following phases to start a session:
1. The client opens a connection with the server.
2. The client and server negotiate cryptographic algorithms and additional parameters.
3. The server sends its public host key for authentication. The client accepts or rejects
the public host key according to its own criteria and its own database of known
host keys. Note that most of the time the client accepts the public host key and it
adds an entry in its database of known host keys.
4. The client and the server derive the session keys.
5. The client is authenticated to the server, the supported methods include: password,
public key, host-based and none.
6. The client requests features needed for its session – e.g. X11 forwarding, TCP/IP
forwarding.
7. The interactive session starts.
In the SSH protocol, at any point during session establishment, the server can termi-
nate the connection and notify the user if it detects an attempt of data tampering or if
it receives a malformed packet.
Steps 1, 2 and 3 are relevant for this work since they represent the target of the
attack described later on. The attack performed against OpenSSH is explained in detail
in Section 5.3.2.
2.5.2 TLS
The TLS protocol4 is a cryptographic protocol used to provide privacy and data integrity
between two communicating parties. The TLS protocol is composed of two layers: the
TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake protocol. Similar to SSH, TLS is built on
top of a reliable transport protocol — e.g. TCP/IP.
3http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4253.txt
4https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246
18
The TLS Record Protocol provides data encryption and message integrity. The TLS
Handshake Protocol allows the client and the server to authenticate each other and ne-
gotiate the cryptographic algorithms to use before any application data is transmitted.
In short, three basic features are provided by the TLS Handshake Protocol to the com-
municating parties: authentication, secure key exchange and reliable negotiation.
The TLS Handshake Protocol involves the following steps:
1. Parties agree on algorithms by exchanging hello messages. Random nonces and
session resumption happens at this stage too.
2. Parties exchange cryptographic parameters to agree on a pre-master secret.
3. Parties exchange certificates and cryptographic information to authenticate them-
selves.
4. Parties compute a master secret using the pre-master information and the random
nonces.
5. Parties negotiate security parameters to the record layer.
6. Parties verify the handshake occurred without tampering and security parameters
calculated are correct.
The TLS protocol is a complex protocol and therefore this work only deals with the
TLS Handshake protocol, which is later exploited in Section 5.3.1.
2.6 Memory Hierarchy
Unfortunately, the amount of fast memory available in a system is relatively small com-
pared to the total amount of memory available, therefore a memory hierarchy is needed
to get the best trade-off between cost and performance. The principle of locality [26] says
that a typical program spends 90% of its execution time in 10% of the code, therefore
is possible to predict with reasonable accuracy the instructions the program will execute
in the near future. Usually two different types of locality are observed in the memory
hierarchy:
• Temporal locality : recently accessed items in memory are very likely to be accessed
again in the near future.
• Spatial locality : contiguous memory addresses tend to be referenced together in
time.
The principle of locality and the technology available at hardware level have led to
complex memory hierarchies with different memory sizes and speeds.
Since fast memory is expensive and its efficient use is highly desirable, a memory
hierarchy composed of several levels is used. Typically, each level is smaller, faster and
more expensive than the next lower level. These smaller and faster memories are called
caches.
Caches exploit the spatial and temporal locality, mentioned before, to access data and
code instructions as fast as possible, thus allowing the processors to operate at extremely
fast speeds, increasing the overall performance of a system.
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2.6.1 Cache architecture
In modern processors the memory hierarchy is structured as follows: higher-level caches
located closer to the processor core, are smaller and faster than low-level caches, which
are located closer to main memory. Intel’s architecture [17] has three levels of cache: L1,
L2 and Last-Level Cache (LLC).
As depicted in Section 1, each core has two L1 caches, a data cache (dcache) and an
instruction cache (icache), each small in size (32 KB) with a short access time (4 cycles).
The L2 caches are, typically, core-private and they have an intermediate size (256 KB)
with intermediate access times (11 cycles). The LLC is shared among all of the cores
and it is a unified cache, containing both data and instructions. Typical LLC sizes are in
the order of megabytes and access time is quite slow compared to the rest of caches (40
cycles).
The unit of memory and allocation in a cache is called cache line. Cache lines are of
a fixed size B, typically, 64 bytes. The lg(B) low-order bits of a memory address, called
line offset, are used to locate the datum in the cache line.
When a memory address is accessed, the processor checks the availability of the ad-
dress line in the top-level L1 caches. If the data is found there then it is served to the
processor, a situation referred to as a cache hit. In a cache miss, when the data is not
found in the L1 caches, the processor repeats the search for the address line in the next
cache level and continues through all the caches. Once the address line is found, the
processor stores a copy in the cache for future use — temporal locality.
Most caches are set-associative and they are composed of S cache sets, each containing
a fixed number of cache lines. The number of cache lines in a set is the cache associativity
— i.e. a cache with W cache lines in each cache set is a W -way set-associative cache.
Since the main memory is orders of magnitude larger than the cache, more than W
memory lines may map to the same cache set. If a cache miss occurs and all the cache
lines in the matching cache set are in use, one of the cached lines is evicted, freeing a slot
for a new line to be fetched from a lower-level memory. Several cache replacement policies
exist to determine the cache line to evict when a cache miss occurs but the typical policy
in use is an approximation to the least-recently-used (LRU).
Modern Intel processors maintain a well-defined relationship between levels of cache
by using the inclusive property. This property ensures the Li+1 cache contains a superset
of the contents of the Li cache, therefore, flushing or evicting data from a lower-level
cache also removes data from all other cache levels of the processor. In other words,
when data is evicted from the LLC, it is also evicted from all of the other levels of cache
in the processor.
The LLC of modern Intel processors, starting from the Sandy Bridge microarchitec-
ture, uses a more complicated architecture to improve the performance. The LLC is
shared among all the cores but it is divided into per-core slices connected by a ring bus.
The slices are separate caches but the bus ensures that each core can access the full LLC.
To distribute the data uniformly in the LLC, Intel uses a hash function which maps
the memory address (excluding the line offset bits) into the sliced id. In the LLC every
cache set is uniquely identified by the slice id and the set index.
Intel architecture implements several cache optimizations. The spatial pre-fetcher
pairs cache lines and attempts to fetch the pair of a missed line [17]. Consecutive accesses
to memory addresses are detected and pre-fetched when the processor anticipates they
may be required [17]. Additionally, when the processor is presented with a conditional
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Figure 1: Intel Sandy Bridge Cache Architecture.
branch, speculative execution brings the data of both branches into the cache before the
branch condition is evaluated [47].
In 2002, Page [39] noted that tracing the sequence of cache hits and misses of a software
may leak information on the internal working of the software, including information that
may lead to recovering cryptographic keys.
2.6.2 Cache Replacement Policies
In the event of a cache miss, old data must be evicted to make room for the new data.
The logic algorithm that helps to determine which data to evict is called the cache
replacement policy. The most common and frequently used cache replacement policy is
an approximation to the Least Recently Used (LRU) policy. As the name implies, the
cache controller keeps age fields for every cache line and when a cache line needs to be
evicted, the cache line with the oldest age value (or least recently used) is evicted. An
approximation to this LRU policy is used in common workstations and in the experiments
performed in this work.
Additional cache replacement policies exist and they are used under specific scenarios,
just to name a few different policies. Most Recently Used (MRU) evicts the cache line
with the youngest age value. Least Frequently Used (LFU) evicts the cache line that is
used least often. And finally, Random evicts a random cache line from the cache.
2.6.3 Address Space Layout Randomization
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a common technique used to protect the
memory address space against buffer overflow and arbitrary code execution attacks [46].
ASLR aims to prevent an attacker from using the attack code to exploit the same flaw
in multiple systems, this is usually done by adding a random offset to the base address.
Since the LLC is physically tagged, and it has no dependencies on the virtual address
space, the present work and the example explained in Chapter 5 does not have to deal with
virtual to physical address mapping, thus the attack is oblivious to this technique [52].
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2.7 Covert Channels
According to Latham [32] in The Orange Book, covert channels are communication chan-
nels that can be exploited to transfer information, violating the system’s security. Covert
channels transfer information in unconventional ways, usually, exploiting system features
that were not intended to be used as a mechanism to transfer data.
Covert channels can be exploited by users, programs or processes and most of the
time covert channels are unintentional, a system user is unaware of their existence and a
malicious party monitors the channel to retrieve information about the system user. On
the other hand, covert channels can be used intentionally to communicate unregulated
information through a system.
Covert channels are an old issue that became relevant due to the confinement prob-
lem. The confinement problem presented by Lampson [31] states that any program in
confinement should be unable to leak any data except to its owner. In the same work,
Lampson mentions that reducing to zero the information leaked requires “far-reaching”
measures due to the impracticality of confined programs.
Covert channels are generally divided into two groups, storage channels and timing
channels.
• Storage channels rely on system variables set by the party leaking the information.
Such variables can be ordering, threshold and interlocks.
• Timing channels rely on a clock as a reference to measure the time it takes for an
event to complete.
Timing channels are relevant for this work because they represent the foundations of
side-channel attacks, including cache-timing attacks.
2.7.1 Memory Cache as a Covert Channel
Microprocessors using caches in the memory hierarchy introduce a covert timing channel.
Since the caches are a resource shared among all the processes running in a system, they
are able to communicate unintended information among each other.
A simple example is two processes, process A and process B, sharing a memory
hierarchy. Process A reads enough information from main memory to fill up the cache.
Then process B reads some “secret” information from main memory, process B will evict
some of the content from the cache to include its information. Finally, process A re-reads
its information, since some of its data was evicted from the cache, it will take a noticeable
longer time to reload information from main memory than information from cache, thus
introducing a timing channel.
As can be seen, this covert channel is introduced by the memory hierarchy at the
hardware level and little can be done to prevent this covert channel since the goal of
caches is to provide faster information retrieval compared to main memory.
2.8 Cryptographic Attacks
Typical methods of classical cryptanalysis are linear and differential cryptanalysis [9] but
more recently implementation attacks started to take an important role in cryptanalysis
as new attack vectors were discovered on the actual implementations.
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2.8.1 Implementation Attacks
In contrast to classic cryptanalytic techniques where the attackers search for vulnera-
bilities in the mathematical properties and structure of the algorithms, implementation
attacks target a physical or concrete implementation of a cryptographic primitive. Several
implementation attacks are used depending on the implementation and the environment
where cryptography is being used and according to Popp [42] the implementation attacks
can be generally classified in two ways.
1. Passive vs. Active
Passive attacks use information emitted by a cryptographic device under normal
environment and standard operational specifications. On the other hand, in ac-
tive attacks the environment is manipulated to cause abnormal behavior of the
cryptographic device and exploit this behavior.
2. Non-invasive vs. Invasive
In non-invasive attacks only the emitted data is exploited, such as running time or
power consumption. An invasive attack manipulates and accesses the components
of the cryptographic device, for example, depackaging a chip, probing, rerouting
wires, etc.
In most of the cases, passive and non-invasive attacks are easier and cheaper to conduct
as the cryptographic devices are not permanently altered nor damaged during the attack.
2.8.2 Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks are passive, non-invasive, implementation attacks where the side
channels are exploited to recover the secret key of the cryptographic algorithms. The
most common and classic side channels exploited include execution time, power con-
sumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiation, but are not limited to only those, sound
and temperature are also considered. Almost any type of output from the cryptographic
devices can be considered as a side channel even if such outputs are not hardware-based
as mentioned before.
The work presented here deals with cache-based side-channel attacks [22] and in this
type of attack the attacker passively monitors the CPU activity of a system. The threat
model can be summarized as a user A which is a spy process running concurrently with
userB, the victim process. Typically, A andB run in user space, where they have separate
virtual memory space that cannot be accessed by other processes – this provides security
by preventing manipulation from malicious processes. Nevertheless, the operating system
shares resources such as libraries and cache memory between users to operate efficiently,
allowing to perform side-channel attacks. An example scenario is the following, the spy
process A monitors specific changes in a shared resource between the processes A and B
– e.g. shared library, memory. While the victim B executes a cryptographic algorithm,
the spy A records the changes in the shared resource and later, an attacker using the side-
channel information collected by A correlates the recorded trace with the cryptographic
algorithm executed by victim B to obtain secret information. This threat model assumes
the attacker has access to the system where the victim process B is running to execute
the spy process A, otherwise the attack is impossible to perform.
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3 Cache-Timing Attacks
Timing attacks are a specific type of side-channel attack where the main goal is to re-
cover the private key of a cryptosystem by measuring the execution time, exploiting the
implementations that do not run in constant time, mainly due to conditional branches
in the algorithm. Slight differences in the input values make basic arithmetic operations
and logic in cryptographic algorithms to run in non-constant time, revealing information
about the algorithm and the state of the system.
Cache-timing attacks use the processor’s cache memory as a side-channel to retrieve
timing measurements of cryptographic algorithms which are key-dependent. Kocher [30]
performed the first side-channel timing attack in a public key cryptosystem, his target
was the right-to-left square-and-multiply implementation of the exponentiation algorithm
in the RSA cryptosystem. For this example, the attacker’s task is to time and trace the
execution of the square operations and multiply operations that are key-dependent. Since
the execution time for every iteration of the algorithm is different when the exponent bit
is 1 (e.g. square-and-multiply) and when the exponent bit is 0 (e.g. square), the attacker
is able to retrieve the exponent used in every step of the algorithm — which is the secret
key for many public-key cryptosystems.
Cache-timing attacks can be generally categorized as time-driven, trace-driven and
access-driven attacks. In time-driven attacks the attacker relies in the total execution time
of the cryptographic computation — e.g encryption and signing. The timing information
of the whole operation reveals the number of cache hits and cache misses during the
execution of the algorithm. In trace-driven attacks, the attacker profiles the cache during
a cryptographic operation to determine cache hits and cache misses. And in access-
driven attacks, the attacker is able to determine which cache sets were accessed during
an operation, useful for cryptosystems where lookup tables are used.
The three categories of cache-timing attacks are similar but used for different purposes,
depending on the cryptographic primitive and the scenario a different approach may be
used. Nevertheless, the three categories exploit the fact that accessing cached data is
much faster compared to accessing data in the main memory.
3.1 Cache-Timing Techniques
Attacking a particular cryptographic primitive requires knowledge of the inner workings
of the primitive and that knowledge leads to different approaches to achieve a success-
ful cache-timing attack. The following sections present some of the techniques used to
perform time-driven, access-driven and trace-driven attacks. The attack performed in
this work and detailed in Chapter 5 is a trace-driven attack, therefore the focus is on
Section 3.1.3 where the Flush+Reload technique is explained in detail.
3.1.1 The Evict+Time Technique
The Evict+Time technique was first discussed by Osvik et al. [38] as a cache-timing
technique against AES. With the knowledge of the cache memory as a covert channel and
the variations on the cache behavior, the authors introduced this time-driven cache-timing
attack.
The Evict+Time technique is a side-channel cache-timing technique that requires
the manipulation of the cache state before each encryption and then observes the ex-
ecution time of the subsequent encryption. Additionally, this technique makes some
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reasonable assumptions, on one hand it assumes the ability to distinguish the beginning
and end of an encryption, as well as the ability to trigger encryptions at will. On the
other hand, since it is a cache-based attack, it assumes knowledge of relevant memory
addresses used by the cryptographic primitive.
In a chosen-plaintext setting and using a plaintext p the Evict+Time technique
works as follows:
1. Trigger an encryption of p in the target process.
2. Evict memory by accessing appropriate memory lines in the attacker’s process.
3. Trigger a second encryption of p and time it.
The rationale behind this technique, and applied against AES, is the following: (1)
in the first step all the AES lookup tables accessed by the target process during the
encryption of p are cached, (2) then the attacker accesses memory blocks in its own
memory space, such memory blocks happen to be mapped to the same cache sets as the
target’s memory blocks, therefore, completely replacing the prior content of the cache.
(3) Finally, timing the encryption of the plaintext reveals information about AES tables
thanks to the timing differences between cache hits and cache misses.
This attack can be extended to scenarios where the attacker triggers known but not
chosen plaintexts, allowing it to narrow down the possible values of the key.
3.1.2 The Prime+Probe Technique
The Prime+Probe technique is an access-driven cache-timing technique proposed by
Osvik et al. [38]. This technique resembles the Evict+Time technique and it is used in
the same work by the authors to attack the same AES implementation. Prime+Probe
differs in the sense that the attacker no longer uses the encryption time as a measurement
score to determine the key but instead the state of the cache after encryption is examined.
Following a chosen-plaintext setting and using a plaintext p, the Prime+Probe
technique works as follows:
1. Prime by filling up the cache.
2. Trigger an encryption of p.
3. Probe by reading memory addresses and measuring the reading time.
In step 1, the attacker fills the cache with its own data. The encryption in step 2
causes partial eviction of some memory lines and in step 3 the attacker probes each cache
set to check if its own data is still present in the cache after the encryption. The cache
sets used during encryption cause cache misses and the cache sets untouched during the
encryption are cache hits, using this timing difference the attacker can recover the key.
The benefit of Prime+Probe over Evict+Time is the measurement resolution
due to timing variance. In the Prime+Probe technique the attacker times operations
performed by itself — e.g. reading the cache. While in the Evict+Time technique,
the attacker relies on operations performed by the target — e.g. encryption and signing,
which include overheads and might be noisy.
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3.1.3 The Flush+Reload Technique
Often the main target of side-channel attacks is the L1 cache due to the close proximity
to the cores. The initial techniques discussed previously (Evict+Time and Prime+
Probe) are effective and possible due to the small sizes of L1 caches, but those techniques
are limited. The possible attacks are limited because in order to perform a successful
attack, the spy and the victim processes must run in the same execution core of the
processor. To overcome this limitation, Yarom and Falkner [52] developed the Flush+
Reload technique. This technique is a side-channel cache-based technique that targets
the LLC in the Intel x86 and x86-64 processors.
The cache-timing attack discussed in this work is based in the Flush+Reload [24,
52] attack, which is a cache-based side-channel attack technique. Unlike the earlier
Prime+Probe technique [38, 40] that detects activity in cache sets, the Flush+Re-
load technique identifies access to memory lines, giving it a high resolution, high accu-
racy and high signal-to-noise ratio.
Like Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload relies on cache sharing between processes.
Additionally, it requires data sharing, which is typically achieved through the use of
shared libraries or using page de-duplication [4, 48].
Algorithm 6 shows a round of the attack. A round of the attack consists of three
phases:
Algorithm 6: Flush+Reload Technique
Input: Memory Address addr.
Result: True if the victim accessed the address.
1 begin
2 flush(addr)
3 Wait for the victim.
4 time ← current time()
5 tmp ← read(addr)
6 readTime ← current time() - time
7 return readTime < threshold
1. In the first phase, to identify victim access to a shared memory line, the attacker
evicts the monitored memory line from the cache.
2. In the second phase, the attacker waits a period of time so the victim has time to
access the memory line.
3. In the third phase, the attacker reloads the memory line and measures the time it
takes to load.
If during the second phase the victim accesses the memory line, the line will be
available in the cache and the reload operation in the third step will take a short time.
If, on the other hand, the victim does not access the memory line then the third step
takes a longer time as the memory line is loaded from main memory. Figure 2 (A) and
(B) illustrate a round of the attack with and without victim access.
26
Figure 2: Timing of Flush+Reload. (A) No Victim Access (B) With Victim Access
(C) With Victim Access Overlap (D) Partial Overlap.
The execution of the victim and the adversary processes are independent from each
other, thus synchronization of probing is important and several factors need to be consid-
ered when processing the side-channel data. Some of those factors are the waiting period
for the adversary between probes, memory lines to be probed, size of the side-channel
trace and cache-hit threshold. Selecting the appropriate parameters make it possible
to detect when the attacker and the victim partially overlap or completely overlap in a
round of attack as depicted in Figure 2 (C) and (D).
One important goal for this attack is to achieve the best resolution possible while
keeping the error rate low and one of the ways to achieve this is by targeting memory
lines that occur frequently during execution, such as loop bodies. Several processor
optimizations are in place during a typical process execution and an attacker must be
aware of these optimizations to filter them during the analysis of the attack results.
A typical implementation of the Flush+Reload attack makes use of the clflush
instruction of the x86 and x86-64 instruction sets. The clflush instruction evicts a spe-
cific memory line from all the cache hierarchy and since it is an unprivileged instruction,
it can be used by any process.
The Flush+Reload attack is possible thanks to the inclusion property of the LLC.
Whenever a memory line is evicted from the LLC, the processor also evicts the line from
L1 and L2 caches. Yarom and Falkner [52] report that the Flush+Reload attack does
not work on AMD processors due to their use of non-inclusive LLCs.
3.1.4 The Spy Process
The code implemented for this work is in Figure 3. The code is really simple, it only
measures the time it takes to read data from a memory address and then evicts the
content of the memory line from the cache.
The spy code starts with the mfence and lfence instructions, these instructions are
used to serialize the instruction stream since usually the instructions are executed out of
order or in parallel by the CPU. On one hand, the lfence instruction partially serialize
by ensuring all the instructions preceding it have been completed before it is executed
and no other instruction after it executes. On the other hand, mfence orders memory
accesses, fence instructions and the clflush instruction.
After the initial fence instructions, the processor’s time stamp counter is called with
the rdtsc instruction. The rdtsc instruction reads the 64-bit counter, it returns the
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1 mfence
2 lfence
3 rdtsc
4 lfence
5 mov %rax, %r10
6 mov (\addr), %rax
7 lfence
8 rdtsc
9 sub %r10, %rax
10 movw %ax, \offset(%rdi, %r9, 2)
11 clflush (\addr)
Figure 3: Spy process.
high 32-bits in the %rdx register and the low 32-bits in %rax register. Since the recorded
timings are really small, in Line 5 the low 32-bits are copied to the %r10 register. Line
6 reads the memory address \addr and then immediately in line 8 the counter is read
again. Lines 9 and 10 compute the timing difference and store the result in the register
%rdi. Finally in line 11 the memory address \addr is flushed from the cache.
Table 2 shows the cache parameters and access times for the Haswell Microarchitec-
ture [17] used in this work. An important aspect to note is the access latency for the
shared L3 cache, which is around 34 cycles.
Level Capacity
Associativity
(ways)
Line Size
(bytes)
Access
Latency
(cycles)
Access
Throughput
(cycles)
L1 Data 32 KB 8 64 3 1
L1 Instruction 32 KB 8 64 N/A N/A
L2 Unified 256 KB 8 64 11 2
Shared L3 6 MB 12 64 34 2
Table 2: Cache Parameters of the Haswell Microarchitecture [17].
Knowing the real time (in CPU cycles) of moving data from one specific memory
address to a register is extremely relevant to fine-tune the parameters used in the Flu-
sh+Reload technique, for that reason, the timings using real equipment are compared
to the timings in Table 2. Later these timings are used to measure the timing difference
of cache hits against cache misses.
To measure cache hits and cache misses, in a similar way as it would be during an
actual attack, the spy process tracks a specific memory address containing the data of
interest. In a cache-timing attack setup, the memory address belongs to a shared library
which can be accessed by both the victim and the spy process.
A cache hit is achieved by calling the shared library, loading the memory address into
the cache. Afterwards, the spy process measures the time required to reload the memory
address available in cache without flushing the memory address. 90% of the memory
loads from the cache took 52 cycles and the rest 10% was split between 42 and 43 cycles,
as observed in Figure 4.
Similarly, a cache hit is achieved by following the same procedure as before but this
time after every measurement, the memory address is flushed from the cache using the
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Figure 4: Probing time (cycles) for 8K cache hits.
clflush command. This forces the system to load the information from main memory
in every iteration. Practically, 100% of the loads from main memory took at least 250
cycles, considerably more than 52 cycles.
Additionally, Intel [17] mentions that continuous cache eviction uses cache bandwidth
and bus bandwidth which causes an overall degradation in cache response times, this last
behavior is observed in Figure 5 where the timing results for cache misses are spread over
times larger than 250 cycles and not as constant as in the case with cache hits.
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Figure 5: Probing time (cycles) for 8K cache misses.
Figure 5 shows the timing differences between cache hits and cache misses.
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Figure 6: Probing time: cache hits vs. cache misses.
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3.1.5 Performance Degradation Technique
To achieve maximum utilization on a single hardware platform multiple processes share
the resources available to them. As a consequence the processes may interfere with each
other, impacting the performance.
A malicious user can misuse the shared resources and exploit the interference to affect
processes running on the same platform. These type of attacks are well known attacks
and they are called performance degradation attacks.
Performance degradation attacks are mainly used as denial of service (DoS) attacks
in which the attacker does not get any direct benefit, the only benefit is to damage and
limit a process or service.
Allan et al. [2] showed that attackers can benefit from performance degradation attacks
to amplify the side-channel attacks. By degrading the performance of a running process,
an attacker can receive more side-channel information to improve the attack.
Following the idea of the Flush+Reload technique, the performance degradation
attack used in this work targets pieces of code that are shared between the victim and the
attacker. Frequently executed code is cached to improve execution performance, therefore
access to the code is fast.
An attacker can degrade the performance by repeatedly evicting memory lines con-
taining code that is executed frequently. By evicting such memory lines, the victim has to
wait for the processor to load the code from main memory which is orders of magnitude
slower than loading from cache memory.
A small number of memory lines are chosen as candidates. During execution, the
chosen memory lines are repeatedly evicted from cache memory to slow down the execu-
tion of a specific program. An efficient attack is achieved by considering the amount of
memory line candidates, the memory load time and the lines evicted. Memory lines that
contain function calls are accessed twice during execution, one before the call and one on
return.
Typically, performance degradation attacks target all of the processes running in a
microprocessor. The performance degradation attack used in this work [2] only targets
programs that use specific shared code segments, in this case, the OpenSSL library.
Similar to the Flush+Reload technique, the requirements for the degradation at-
tack are a shared inclusive LLC and the ability to efficiently evict memory lines from
cache.
3.1.6 The Degrading Process
The degrading process implemented for this work is shown in Figure 7. The degrading
process is really simple and its main function is to evict memory lines from the cache.
1 1:
2 clflush (\addr1)
3 clflush (\addr2)
4 clflush (\addr3)
5 jmp 1b
Figure 7: Degrading process.
The same clflush instruction used in the Flush+Reload technique is used for the
performance degradation attack. The code iterates continuously through the clflush
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calls, evicting the content in the memory addresses of registers addr1, addr2 and addr3.
As explained in Section 3.1.5 the memory addresses to evict are chosen according to
the target process, for this work three addresses allow to degrade the victim process to a
threshold that produces good results.
The degrading process runs in parallel with the spy and the victim processes, slowing
down the performance of the victim process and allowing the spy process to get a high
quality profile from the cache.
3.2 Partial key disclosure
Recall from Section 2.3.5 that in DSA the nonce k and the secret key α satisfy a linear
congruence. The constants of the linear combination are specified by s, h(m), and r,
which, typically for a signed message, are all public. Hence, knowing the nonce k reveals
the secret key α.
α = r−1(sk −H(m)).
Typically, side-channel leakage from SWE only recovers partial information about the
nonce. The adversary, therefore, has to use that partial information to recover the key.
The usual technique [1, 2, 7, 13, 14, 27, 36, 37, 41] for recovering the secret key from the
partial information is to express the problem as a hidden number problem (NHP) [11]
which is solved using a lattice technique.
3.2.1 The Hidden Number Problem
In the hidden number problem (HNP) the task is to find a hidden number given some of
the MSBs of several modular linear combinations of the hidden number. More specifically,
the problem is to find a secret number α given a number of triples (ti, ui, `i) such that
for vi = |α · ti− ui|q we have |vi| ≤ q/2`i+1, where | · |q is the reduction modulo q into the
range (−q/2, . . . , q/2).
Boneh and Venkatesan [11] initially investigate HNP with a constant `i = `. They
show that for ` < log1/2 q+log log q and random ti, the hidden number α can be recovered
given a number of triples linear in log q.
Howgrave et al. [27] extend the work of Boneh and Venkatesan [11] showing how to
construct an HNP instance from leaked LSBs and MSBs of DSA nonces. Nguyen and
Shparlinski [36] prove that for a good enough hash function and for a linear number of
randomly chosen nonces, knowing the ` LSBs of a certain number of nonces, the ` + 1
MSBs or 2 · ` consecutive bits anywhere in the nonces is enough for recovering the long
term key α. They further demonstrate that a DSA-160 key can be broken if only the 3
LSBs of a certain number of nonces are known. Nguyen and Shparlinski [37] extend the
results to ECDSA, and Liu and Nguyen [34] demonstrate that only 2 LSBs are required
for breaking a DSA-160 key. Benger et al. [7] extend the technique to use a different
number of leaked LSBs for each signature.
3.2.2 Lattice attack
To find the hidden number from the triples we solve a lattice problem. The construction
of the lattice problem presented here is due to Benger et al. [7], and is based on the
constructions in earlier publications [11, 36].
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Given d triples, a d+1-dimensional lattice is constructed using the rows of the matrix
B =

2`1+1 · q
. . .
2`d+1 · q
2`1+1 · t1 . . . 2`d+1 · td 1
 .
By the definition of vi, there are integers λi such that vi = λi · q + α · ti − ui.
Consequently, for the vectors x = (λ1, . . . , λd, α), y = (2
`1+1 · v1, . . . , 2`d+1 · vd, α) and
u = (2`1+1 · u1, . . . , 2`d+1 · ud, 0) yield
x ·B − u = y.
The 2-norm of the vector y is about
√
d+ 1 · q whereas the determinant of the lattice
L(B) is 2d+
∑
li · qd. Hence y is a short vector in the lattice and the vector u is close to
the lattice vector x ·B. Solving the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) with inputs B and u
finds x, revealing the value of the hidden number α.
3.3 Cache-Timing Data Processing
Processing cache-timing data is not a trivial task and performing this task manually takes
expertise, time and patience. Automating the analysis and processing of cache-timing
data is highly desirable, since the amount of data can be huge depending on the target
process. The following two techniques, Vector Quantization (VQ) and Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) have been in use for several years to solve different data coding and
modeling issues—e.g. data compression, pattern recognition, clustering.
Chari et al. [15] used VQ to perform power analysis, Karlof and Wagner [29] and
Green et al. [23] analyzed side-channel information using HMMs. Side-channel analysis
resembles data correction, where the closest approximation of the algorithm state se-
quence recovered from the trace to the real algorithm sequence is needed to successful
recover information about the cryptographic operation.
3.3.1 Vector Quantization
Vector Quantization is a signal processing technique used to map a set of vectors from
a big domain to a reduced set of vectors called the codebook. The crux of this technique
is matching vectors to the closest representative in the codebook using the Euclidean
distance as a metric.
Typically, VQ is used in side-channel processing due to the multidimensionality of
cache-timing data. Depending on the cache-timing technique used and the target’s hard-
ware platform specifications, cache-timing data may have a big dimension—e.g. 32 or 64.
As the dimension increases it is more complex to analyze and map the side-channel data
to the codebook.
The codebook is produced during the profiling stage by the attacker where in a con-
trolled setup, such as its own user space, the attacker spies the target process with known
secret inputs. Using this approach the attacker is able to create a good codebook that
yields a good guess at the target process.
VQ gives a good approximation to the sequence of states from a target, nevertheless,
due to the noise and the errors of the spy process itself it is not sufficient to recover the
original sequence of states which depends on the algorithm running in the target process.
Therefore, the HMM technique is the next step to infer the algorithm state.
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Figure 8: An HMM transition model for DSA’s SWE algorithm.
3.3.2 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are statistical models for modeling discrete-time stochas-
tic processes and they are useful to model systems that behave like a probabilistic finite-
state machine. Probabilistic finite-state systems have hidden states and only by observing
the emissions of their states is possible to infer the system.
The previous definition adjusts perfectly to the goal of side-channel analysis, a cryp-
tographic process is executed and it is known that the process has hidden states. By
observing the timing emissions leaked through the side-channel is possible to infer the
process.
HMMs offer a signal processing technique that enhance the result of the signal by
eliminating noise in the signal and trying to guess the states of the algorithm used by the
process.
3.3.3 Cache-Timing Data Analysis for DSA
Since the attack performed in this work is based on the Flush+Reload technique, the
dimension of the cache-timing data is small enough to cluster it using the VQ technique,
therefore this work skips that step. Knowing the sequence of algorithm states is crucial
to perform a cache-timing attack and recover the DSA’s secret key. Applying the HMM
technique, the sequence of states for the SWE algorithm is recovered with high accu-
racy, allowing the extraction of partial information from every trace recorded by the spy
process.
Constructing an HMM where the hidden part models the operations of the SWE
algorithm – squares and multiplications, is an important step towards secret key recovery.
Figure 8 illustrates the HMM transition model of the SWE algorithm exploited in this
work.
Each label denotes the operation performed in each state and separate states are used
to denote the system state before and after the execution of the algorithm. For the SWE
algorithm implemented in OpenSSL’s DSA, it is known that every window ei starts and
ends with “1”s and for a 160/1024-bit key pair, the window size L(ei) = 4, therefore
it is possible (although very unlikely) to have at most 4 sequences of square-multiply
operations.
The most significant bit of the exponent is handled by the state s2 and thanks to the
performance degradation technique, no unknown states are observed.
The set of emissions for this HMM is V = {Sqr,Mul, Empty} which is obtained from
the possible states observed in the cache. The state set is defined by S = s1, ..., s7. States
s1 and s7 are assumed to emit Empty, states s2, s3, s5 and s6 emit Sqr and finally, state
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s4 only emits Mul.
Using rough estimates the initial model parameters are set and the model is trained
using observations from the cache-timing information recorded during the profile phase
mentioned in Section 3.1.3 where the secret and the algorithm operation is known.
The output sequence obtained in this step is then used in conjunction with the lattice-
based attack to mount the key recovery attack. As mentioned earlier, due to limitations on
the spy process, is not possible to get perfect traces and therefore is not possible to recover
a perfect state sequence. Additionally, for DSA, knowing the perfect state sequence does
not reveal the secret key directly although it would allow to use a considerable small
amount of signatures during the key recovery attack.
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4 Related Work
Over the past few years, research work has focused in cache-timing attacks, and cryp-
tographic algorithms are the standard choice to demonstrate the success of this type of
attacks, mainly due to the nature of their relevance.
Several authors describe attacks on cryptographic systems that exploit partial nonce
disclosure to recover long-term private keys.
Page [39] did the first formal studies of the security threats associated with the cache
behavior and the information leaked through the cache. The author demonstrated the
theoretical aspects of the attack and an implementation of his attack on DES encryption
algorithm.
Percival [40] expanded the idea of cache attacks and performed an attack by observing
the cache sets accessed during encryption of RSA’s sliding window algorithm implemented
in OpenSSL (0.9.7c). The access to cache sets revealed enough bits of the exponent to
compute the secret exponent in polynomial time.
Brumley and Hakala [13] use an L1 data cache-timing attack to recover the LSBs of
ECDSA nonces from the dgst command line tool in OpenSSL 0.9.8k. Combining VQ
and HMMs explained in Section 3.3, they collect 2,600 signatures (8K with noise) and
use the Howgrave et al. [27] attack to recover a 160-bit ECDSA private key. In a similar
vein, Acıic¸mez et al. [1] use an L1 instruction cache-timing attack to recover the LSBs
of DSA nonces from the same tool in OpenSSL 0.9.8l, requiring 2,400 signatures (17K
with noise) to recover a 160-bit DSA private key. Both attacks require HyperThreading
architectures.
Gullasch et al. [24] expanded on the spy process by exploiting the Completely Fair
Scheduler used in Linux systems and for the first time they proposed the use of the
clflush instruction for evicting caches. The authors performed an asynchronous attack
where they managed to profile the cache with a high granularity compared to previous
works. They evicted and probed to create a trace of the cache which was later used to
recover the cipher keys used on OpenSSL’s AES (0.9.8n).
Brumley and Tuveri [14] mount a remote timing attack on the implementation of
ECDSA with binary curves in OpenSSL 0.9.8o. They show that the timing leaks infor-
mation on the MSBs of the nonce used and that after collecting that information over
8,000 TLS handshakes the private key can be recovered.
Benger et al. [7] recover the secret key of OpenSSL’s ECDSA implementation for the
curve secp256k1 using less than 256 signatures. The authors make use of the Flush+
Reload technique to target the LLC, they extend the lattice technique of Howgrave et
al. [27] and after a considerable smaller effort they achieve success. They improved over
previous lattice-based techniques by using all the leaked bits rather than limiting to a
fixed number of bits.
Following the steps of Benger et al. [7], van de Pol et al. [41] exploit the structure of
the modulus in some elliptic curves to use all of the information leaked in consecutive
sequences of bits anywhere in the top half of the nonces, allowing them to recover the
secret key after observing only a handful of signatures. Their target is the secp256k1
curve of ECDSA on OpenSSL (1.0.1f).
Allan et al. [2] improve on these results by using a performance-degradation attack
to amplify the side-channel. The amplification allows them to observe the sign bit in the
wNAF representation used in OpenSSL 1.0.2a and to recover a 256-bit key after observing
only 6 signatures.
35
Genkin et al. [20] perform electromagnetic and power analysis attacks on mobile
phones. They show how to construct HNP triples when the signature uses the low s-
value [50].
Finally, relevant to this work but in a different direction, Liu and Nguyen [34] offer
a novel approach to solve the Basic Bounded Decoding (BDD) lattice problem used in
cryptanalysis. The authors used BDD enumeration to perform a practical attack on DSA
with partially known nonces.
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5 Implementation
5.1 A New Software Defect
Percival [40] demonstrated that the SWE implementation of modular exponentiation in
OpenSSL version 0.9.7g is vulnerable to cache-timing attacks, applied to recover RSA pri-
vate keys. Following the issue, the OpenSSL team committed two code changes relevant
to this work. The first5 adds a “constant-time” implementation of modular exponentia-
tion, with a fixed-window implementation and using the scatter-gather method [12, 53]
of masking table access to the multipliers.
The new implementation is slower than the original SWE implementation. To avoid
using the slower new code when the exponent is not secret, OpenSSL added a flag
(BN FLG CONSTTIME) to its representation of big integers. When the exponent should
remain secret (e.g. in decryption and signing) the flag is set (e.g. in the case of DSA
nonces, Figure 9, Line 252) at runtime and the exponentiation code takes the “constant-
time” execution path (Figure 10, Line 413). Otherwise, the original SWE implementation
is used.
The execution time of the “constant-time” implementation still depends on the bit
length of the exponent, which in the case of DSA should be kept secret [11, 14, 36]. The
second commit6 aims to “make sure DSA signing exponentiations really are constant-
time” by ensuring that the bit length of the exponent is fixed. This safe default behavior
can be disabled by applications enabling the DSA FLAG NO EXP CONSTTIME flag at runtime
within the DSA structure, although we are not aware of any such cases.
To get a fixed bit length, the DSA implementation adds γq to the randomly chosen
nonce, where γ ∈ {1, 2}, such that the bit length of the sum is one more than the bit
length of q. More precisely, the implementation creates a copy of the nonce k (Figure 9,
Line 264), adds q to it (Line 274), checks if the bit length of the sum is one more than
that of q (Line 276), otherwise it adds q again to the sum (Line 277). If q is n bits, then
k + q is either n or n + 1 bits. In the former case, indeed k + 2q is n + 1 bits. As an
aside, we note the code in question is not constant time and potentially leaks the value
of γ. Such a leak would create a bias that can be exploited to mount the Bleichenbacher
attack [3, 10, 18].
While the procedure in this commit ensures that the bit length of the sum kq is fixed,
unfortunately it introduces a software defect. The function BN copy is not designed to
propagate flags from the source to the destination. In fact, OpenSSL exposes a distinct
API BN with flags for that functionality—quoting the documentation:
BN with flags creates a temporary shallow copy of b in dest . . . Any flags
provided in flags will be set in dest in addition to any flags already set in
b. For example this might commonly be used to create a temporary copy of a
BIGNUM with the BN FLG CONSTTIME flag set for constant time operations.
In contrast, with BN copy the BN FLG CONSTTIME flag does not propagate to kq. Conse-
quently, the sum is not treated as secret, reverting the change made in the first commit—
when the exponentiation wrapper subsequently gets called (Figure 9, Line 285), it fails the
security-critical branch. Following a debug session in Figure 10, indeed the flag (explicit
5-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/46a643763de6d8e39ecf6f76fa79b4d04885aa59
6-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0ebfcc8f92736c900bae4066040b67f6e5db8edb
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246 /* Get random k */
247 do
248 if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
249 goto err;
250 while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
251 if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
252 BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
253 }
...
263 if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
264 if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
265 goto err;
266
267 /*
268 * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
269 * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
270 * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not
271 * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.)
272 */
273
274 if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
275 goto err;
276 if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) {
277 if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q))
278 goto err;
279 }
280
281 K = &kq;
282 } else {
283 K = &k;
284 }
285 DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
286 dsa->method_mont_p);
Figure 9: Excerpt from OpenSSL’s dsa sign setup in crypto/dsa/dsa ossl.c. Line
252 sets the BN FLG CONSTTIME flag, yet BN copy on Line 264 does not propagate it. The
subsequent Line 285 exponentiation call will have pointer K with the flag clear.
value 0x4) is not set, and the execution skips the call to BN mod exp mont consttime
and instead continues with the insecure SWE code path for DSA exponentiation.
In addition to testing our attack against OpenSSL (1.0.2h), we reviewed the code
of two popular OpenSSL forks: LibreSSL7 [44] and BoringSSL8 [43]. Using builds with
debugging symbols, we confirm both LibreSSL and BoringSSL share the same defect. It
is worth noting that BoringSSL stripped out TLS DSA cipher suites in late 20149.
5.2 Exploiting the Defect
In this section we describe how we use and combine the Flush+Reload technique with
a performance degradation technique [2] to attack the OpenSSL implementation of DSA.
We tested our attack on an Intel Core i5-4570 Haswell Quad-Core 3.2GHz (22nm)
with 16GB of memory running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 LTS “Trusty”. Each core has an
8-way 32KB L1 data cache, an 8-way 32KB L1 instruction cache, an 8-way 256KB L2
unified cache, and all the cores share a 12-way 6MB unified LLC (all with 64B lines). It
does not feature HyperThreading.
7-https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/blob/873a225ece61e25b02dafea9676e0ba90519e764/
src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
8-https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/master/crypto/dsa/dsa.c
9-https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/ef2116d33c3c1b38005eb59caa2aaa6300a9b450
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+--bn_exp.c--------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|402 int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, |
|403 const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) |
|404 { |
B+ |405 int i, j, bits, ret = 0, wstart, wend, window, wvalue; |
|406 int start = 1; |
|407 BIGNUM *d, *r; |
|408 const BIGNUM *aa; |
|409 /* Table of variables obtained from ’ctx’ */ |
|410 BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE]; |
|411 BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; |
|412 |
>|413 if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { |
|414 return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont); |
|415 } |
|416 |
|417 bn_check_top(a); |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|0x7ffff779db3e <BN_mod_exp_mont+92> mov 0x14(%rax),%eax |
|0x7ffff779db41 <BN_mod_exp_mont+95> and $0x4,%eax |
|0x7ffff779db44 <BN_mod_exp_mont+98> test %eax,%eax |
>|0x7ffff779db46 <BN_mod_exp_mont+100> je 0x7ffff779db85 <BN_mod_exp_mont+163> |
|0x7ffff779db48 <BN_mod_exp_mont+102> mov -0x1b0(%rbp),%r8 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
child process 29096 In: BN_mod_exp_mont Line: 413 PC: 0x7ffff779db46
(gdb) break BN_mod_exp_mont
Breakpoint 1 (BN_mod_exp_mont) pending.
(gdb) run dgst -dss1 -sign ~/dsa.pem -out ~/lsb-release.sig /etc/lsb-release
Starting program: /usr/local/ssl/bin/openssl \
dgst -dss1 -sign ~/dsa.pem -out ~/lsb-release.sig /etc/lsb-release
Breakpoint 1, BN_mod_exp_mont (...) at bn_exp.c:405
(gdb) backtrace
#0 BN_mod_exp_mont (...) at bn_exp.c:405
#1 0x00007ffff77eea62 in dsa_sign_setup (...) at dsa_ossl.c:285
#2 0x00007ffff77ee344 in DSA_sign_setup (...) at dsa_sign.c:87
#3 0x00007ffff77ee53d in dsa_do_sign (...) at dsa_ossl.c:159
#4 0x00007ffff77ee30c in DSA_do_sign (...) at dsa_sign.c:75
...
(gdb) stepi
(gdb) info register eax
eax 0x0 0
(gdb) print BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME)
$1 = 0
(gdb) macro expand BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME)
expands to: ((p)->flags&(0x04))
(gdb) print ((p)->flags&(0x04))
$2 = 0
(gdb)
Figure 10: Debugging OpenSSL DSA signing in crypto/bn/bn exp.c. The Line 413
branch is not taken since BN FLG CONSTTIME is not set, as seen from the print command
outputs. Hence BN mod exp mont consttime is not called— the control flow continues
with classical SWE code.
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We used our own build of OpenSSL 1.0.2h which is the same default build of OpenSSL
but with debugging symbols on the executable. Debugging symbols facilitate mapping
source code to memory addresses but they are not loaded during run time, thus the
victim’s performance is not affected. Debugging symbols are, typically, not available to
attackers but using reverse engineering techniques [16] is possible to map source code to
memory addresses.
It is well known [34, 36], but not trivial, that knowing a few bits of sufficiently many
signatures allows an attacker to recover the secret key. This is the goal of our attack,
we trace and recover side-channel information of the SWE algorithm that reveals the
sequence of squares and multiplications, from that sequence we recover a few bits that
we use for the lattice attack described in Section 5.4.
As seen in Figure 10, every time OpenSSL performs a DSA signature, the expo-
nentiation method BN mod exp mont in crypto/bn/bn exp.c gets called. There, the
BN FLG CONSTTIME flag is checked but due to the software defect discussed in Section 5.1
the condition fails and the routine continues with the SWE pre-computation and then the
actual exponentiation. For the finite field operations, BN mod exp mont calls BN mod mul montgomery
in crypto/bn/bn mont.c and from there, the multiply wrapper bn mul mont is called,
where, by default for x64 targets, assembly code is executed to perform low level op-
erations using BIGNUMs for square and multiplication. OpenSSL uses Montgomery
representation for efficiency. Note that for other platforms and/or non-default build
configurations, the actual code executed ranges from pure C implementation to entirely
different assembly. The attacker can easily adapt to these different execution paths, but
the discussion that follows is geared towards our target platform. It is worth mentioning,
the spy process does not know when a signature starts and ends but this can be deduced
by looking for a sequence of consecutive multiplications in each trace, this indicates the
SWE’s pre-computation phase.
The threshold set for the load time in the Flush+Reload technique (cache hit
vs. cache miss) is system and software dependent. From our measurements we set this
threshold accordingly since the load times from LLC and from memory were clearly
defined. Figure 12 shows that loads from LLC take less that 100 cycles, while loads from
main memory take more than 200 cycles.
As mentioned before, to get better resolution and granularity during the attack one
effective strategy is to target body loops or routines that are invoked several times. For
that reason we probe, using the Flush+Reload technique, inner routines used for
square and multiply. Since squares can be computed more efficiently than multiplication,
OpenSSL’s multiply wrapper checks if the two pointer operands are the same and, if so,
calls to assembly squaring code (bn sqr8x mont)—otherwise, to assembly multiply code
(bn mul4x mont).
At the same time we run a performance degradation attack, flushing actively used
memory addresses during these routines (e.g. assembly labels Lsqr4x inner and Linner4x,
respectively). We slow down the execution time to a safe, but not noticeable by the victim,
threshold that ensures a good trace by our spy program. In our experiments, we observe
slow down factors of roughly 16 and 26 for 1024-bit and 2048-bit DSA, respectively due
to the degrade technique.
Using this strategy, our spy program collects data from two channels: one for square
latencies and the other for multiply latencies. We then apply signal processing techniques
to this raw channel data. A moving average filter on the data results in Figure 11 and
Figure 12 for 1024-bit and 2048-bit DSA, respectively. There is a significant amount
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of information to extract from these signals on the SWE algorithm state transitions
and hence exponent bit values. Generally, extracted multiplications yield a single bit of
information and the squares yield the position for these bits. Some short examples follow.
Stepping through Figure 11, the initial low amplitude for the multiply signal is the
multiplication for converting the base operand to Montgomery representation. The sub-
sequent low amplitude for the square signal is the temporary square value used to build
the odd powers for the SWE pre-computation table (i.e. s in Figure 5). The subse-
quent long period of low multiply amplitude is the successive multiplications to build the
pre-computation table itself. Then begins the main loop of SWE. As an upward slop-
ing multiply amplitude intersects a downward sloping square amplitude, this marks the
transition from a multiplication operation to a square operation (and vice versa). This
naturally occurs several times as the main exponentiation loop iterates. The end of this
particular signal shows a final transition from multiply to a single square, indicating that
the exponent is even and the two LSBs are 1 and 0.
Stepping through Figure 12 is similar, yet the end of this particular signal shows a
final transition from square to multiply—indicating that the exponent is odd, i.e. the
LSB is 1.
Even when employing the degrade technique, it is important to observe the vast
granularity difference between these two cryptographic settings. On average, a 2048-bit
signal is roughly ten times the length of a 1024-bit signal, even when the exponent is only
60% longer (i.e. 256-bit vs. 160-bit). This generally suggests we should be able to extract
more accurate information from 2048-bit signals than 1024-bit—i.e., the higher security
cryptographic parameters are more vulnerable to side-channel attack in this case. See
[49, 51, 52] for similar examples of this phenomenon.
Granularity is vital to determining the number of squares interleaved between mul-
tiplications. Since, in our environment, there appears to be no reliable indicator in the
signal for transitions from one square to the next, we estimate the number of adjacent
squares by the horizontal distance between multiplications. Since the channel is latency
data, we also have reference clock cycle counter values so another estimate is based on
the counter differences at these points. Our experiments showed no significant advantage
of one approach over the other.
Extracting the multiplications from the signal and interleaving them with a number of
consecutive squares proportional to the width of the corresponding gap gives us the square
and multiplication SM sequence, that the SWE algorithm passed through. Figure 15
shows an example of an SM sequence recorded by the spy program when OpenSSL signs
using 2048-bit DSA.
Our spy program is able to capture most of the SM sequence accurately. It can miss
or duplicate a few squares due to drift but is able to capture all of the multiplication
operations. Closer to the LSBs, the information extracted from the SM sequence is more
reliable since the bit position is lost if any square operation is missed during probing —
on average three LSBs are recovered per trace.
In summary, we performed our attack in a system under normal workload but we
focused only on the three processes of interest – i.e. victim, spy and degradation processes.
The three processes executed in three different cores. The first core executed the victim
process, in this case OpenSSL’s DSA algorithm. The second core executed our spy process
while the third core executed the performance degradation process. The knowledge of
the message and the signature is assumed since this information is public and can be
obtained legitimately – see Section 5.3.
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Figure 11: Complete filtered trace of a 1024-bit DSA sign operation during an OpenSSH
SSH-2 handshake.
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Figure 12: Complete filtered trace of a 2048-bit DSA sign operation during an stunnel
TLS 1.2 handshake.
5.3 Victimizing Applications
The defect from the previous section is in a shared library. Potentially any application
that links against OpenSSL for DSA functionality can be affected by this vulnerability.
But to make our attack concrete, we focus on two ubiquitous protocols and applications:
TLS within stunnel and SSH within OpenSSH.
As we discuss later in Section 5.4, the trace data alone is not enough for private key
recovery—we also need the digital signatures themselves and (hashed) messages. To this
end, the goal of this section is to describe the practical tooling we developed to exploit
the defect within these applications, collecting both trace data and protocol messages.
5.3.1 Attacking TLS
To feature TLS support, one option for network applications that do not natively
support TLS communication is to use stunnel10, a popular portable open source software
package that forwards network connections from one port to another and provides a TLS
wrapper. A typical stunnel use case is listening on a public port to expose a TLS-enabled
network service, then connecting to a localhost port where a non-TLS network service
is listening—stunnel provides a TLS layer between the two ports. It links against the
OpenSSL shared library to provide this functionality. For our experiments, we used stun-
nel 5.32 compiled from stock source and linked against OpenSSL 1.0.2h. We generated a
2048-bit DSA certificate for the stunnel service and chose the DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256
TLS 1.2 cipher suite.
We wrote a custom TLS client that connects to this stunnel service. It launches our spy
to collect the timing signals, but its main purpose is to carry out the TLS handshake and
collect the digital signatures and protocol messages. Figure 13 shows the TLS handshake.
Relevant to this work, the initial ClientHello message contains a 32-byte random field,
10https://www.stunnel.org
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Client Server
ClientHello
[random,
CipherSuite] ------->
ServerHello
[random,
cipher_suite]
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
[params,
HashAlgorithm,
SignatureAlgorithm,
signed_params]
<------- ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
(ChangeCipherSpec)
Finished ------->
(ChangeCipherSpec)
<------- Finished
Application Data <------> Application Data
Figure 13: Our custom client carries out TLS handshakes, collecting certain fields from the
ClientHello, ServerHello, and SeverKeyExchange messages to construct the digest. It
collects timing traces in parallel to the server’s DSA sign operation, said digital signature
being included in a SeverKeyExchange field and collected by our client.
and similarly the server’s ServerHello message. In practice, these are usually a 4-byte
UNIX timestamp concatenated with a 28-byte nonce. The Certificate message con-
tains the DSA certificate we generated for the stunnel service. The ServerKeyExchange
message contains a number of critical fields for our attack: Diffie-Hellman key exchange
parameters, the signature algorithm and hash function identifiers, and finally the dig-
ital signature itself in the signed params field. Given our stunnel configuration and
certificate, the 2048-bit DSA signature is over the concatenated string
ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random +
ServerKeyExchange.params
and the hash function is SHA-512, both dictated by the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
field (explicit values 0x6, 0x2). Our client saves the hash of this string and the DER-
encoded digital signature sent from the server. All subsequent messages, including
ServerHelloDone and any client responses, are not required by our attack. Our client
therefore drops the connection at this stage, and repeats this process several hundred
times to build up a set of distinct trace, digital signature, and digest tuples. See Sec-
tion 5.4 for our explicit attack parameters. Figure 12 is a typical signal extracted by
our spy program in parallel to the handshake between our client and the victim stunnel
service.
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5.3.2 Attacking SSH
OpenSSH11 is a suite of tools whose main goal is to provide secure communications over
an insecure channel using the SSH network protocol.
OpenSSH is linked to the OpenSSL shared library to perform several cryptographic
operations, including digital signatures. For our experiments we used the stock OpenSSH
6.6.1p1 binary package from the Ubuntu repository, and pointed the run-time shared
library loader at OpenSSL 1.0.2h. The DSA key pair used by the server and targeted by
our attack is the default 1024-bit key pair generated during installation of OpenSSH.
Similar to Section 5.3.1, we wrote a custom SSH client that launches our spy program,
the spy program collects the timing signals during the handshake. At the same time it
performs an SSH handshake where the protocol messages and the digital signature are
collected for our attack.
Relevant to this work, the SSH protocol defines the Diffie-Hellman key exchange pa-
rameters in the SSH MSG KEXINIT message, along with the signature algorithm and the
hash function identifiers. Additionally a 16-byte random nonce is sent for host authenti-
cation by the client and the server.
The SSH MSG KEXDH REPLY message contains the server’s public key (used to create
and verify the signature), server’s DH public key f (used to compute the shared secret
K in combination with the client’s DH public key e) and the signature itself. Figure 14
shows the SSH handshake with the critical parameters sent in every message relevant for
the attack. To be more precise, the signature is over the SHA-1 hash of the concatenated
string
ClientVersion + ServerVersion +
Client.SSH_MSG_KEXINIT + Server.SSH_MSG_KEXINIT +
Server.publicKey + minSize + prefSize + maxSize +
p + g + e + f + K
As the key exchange12 and public key parameters, our SSH client was configured to
use diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and ssh-dss respectively. Note that two
different hashing functions may be used, one hash function for the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange and another hash function for the signing algorithm, which for DSA is the
SHA-1 hash function.
Similarly to the TLS case, our client saves the hash of the concatenated string and
the digital signature raw bytes sent from the server. All subsequent messages, including
SSH MSG NEWKEYS and any client responses, are not required by our attack. Our client
therefore drops the connection at this stage, and repeats this process several hundred
times to build up a set of distinct trace, digital signature, and digest tuples. See Sec-
tion 5.4 for our explicit attack parameters. Figure 11 is a typical signal extracted by our
spy program in parallel to the handshake between our client and the victim SSH server.
5.3.3 Observations
These two widely deployed protocols share many similarities in their handshakes regard-
ing e.g. signaling, content of messages, and security context of messages. However, in
11http://www.openssh.com
12https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4419
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Client Server
ClientVersion ----->
ServerVersion
SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
[Nonce, KEX_alg,
<----- publicKey_alg]
SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
[Nonce, KEX_alg,
publicKey_alg]
SSH_KEXDH_GEX_REQUEST
[minSize, prefSize,
maxSize] ----->
SSH_KEXDH_GEX_GROUP
<----- [p, g]
SSH_KEXDH_GEX_INIT
[e] ----->
SSH_KEXDH_GEX_REPLY
[publicKey, f,
<----- Signature]
SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS
----->
Application Data <----> Application Data
Figure 14: Our custom client carries out SSH handshakes, collecting parameters from all
the messages to construct the digest. It collects timing traces in parallel to the server’s
DSA sign operation, said digital signature being included in a SSH KEXDH GEX REPLY field
and collected by our client.
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the process of designing and implementing our attacker clients we observe a subtle dif-
ference in the threat model between the two. In TLS, all values that go into the hash
function to compute the digital signature are public and can be observed (unencrypted)
in various handshake messages. In SSH, most of the values are public—the exception is
the last input to the hash function: the shared DH key. The consequence is side-channel
attacks against TLS can be passive, listening to legitimate handshakes not initiated by
the attacker yet collecting side-channel data as this occurs. In SSH, the attacker must be
active and initiate its own handshakes—without knowing the shared DH key, a passive
attacker cannot compute the corresponding digest needed later for the lattice stage of
the attack. We find this innate protocol level side-channel property to be an intriguing
feature, and a factor that should be carefully considered during protocol design.
5.4 Recovering the private key
In previous sections we showed how our attack can recover the sequence of square and
multiply operations that the victim performs. We further showed how to get the signature
information matching each sequence for both SSH and TLS. We now turn to recovering
the private key from the information we collect.
The scheme we use is similar to past works. We first use the side-channel information
we capture to collect information on the nonce used in each signature. We use the
information to construct HNP instances and use a lattice technique to find the private
key. Further details on each step are provided below.
5.4.1 Extracting the least significant bits
In Section 5.2 we showed how we collect the SM sequences of each exponentiation. From
every SM sequence, we extract a few LSBs to be used later in the lattice attack. LSBs are
extracted by observing the SM trailing sequence from each trace and then comparing it
against known SM trailing sequences, always looking for the best trade-off between bits
recovered from each trace and the number of signatures required for the lattice attack.
Table 3 contains our empirical accuracy statistics for various relevant patterns trailing
the SM sequences, these trailing SM sequences were chosen according to multiplier usage
patterns. Menezes et al. [35] mention that for a window size of S, the expected distance
between non-zero windows is S+1 — i.e. number of squares between multiply operations,
thus we focused in trailing patterns repeated with higher probability. Furthermore, not for
the SWE in isolation but rather in the context of OpenSSL DSA executing in real world
applications (TLS via stunnel, SSH via OpenSSH), as described above in Section 5.3. All
of these patterns correspond to recovering a = k¯ mod 2` for an exponent k¯.
From these figures, we note two trends. (1) The accuracy decreases as ` increases
due to deviation in the square operation width. Yet weighed with the exponentially
decreasing probability of the longer patterns, the practical impact diminishes. (2) As
expected, we generally obtain more accurate results with 2048-bit vs. 1024-bit due to
granularity. These numbers show that, exploiting our new software defect and leveraging
the techniques in Section 5.2, we can recover a with extremely high probability.
5.4.2 Lattice attack implementation
Recall that to protect against timing attacks OpenSSL uses an exponent k¯ equivalent to
the randomly selected nonce k. k¯ is calculated by adding the modulus q once or twice to
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` a Bit Pattern SM Pattern Accuracy (%) Accuracy (%)
1024-bit, SSH 2048-bit, TLS
1 1 1 SSM 99.9 99.9
2 2 10 SMS 99.9 99.7
2 3 11 SMSM 98.2 97.2
3 4 100 SSMSS 99.7 99.7
3 6 110 SMSMS 99.4 98.2
4 8 1000 SSMSSS 97.8 99.6
4 12 1100 SMSMSS 98.4 97.8
5 16 10000 SSMSSSS 96.7 99.1
5 24 11000 SMSMSSS 95.0 97.6
6 32 100000 SSMSSSSS 85.1 98.8
6 48 110000 SMSMSSSS 90.4 95.0
7 64 1000000 SSMSSSSSS 87.5 97.5
7 96 1100000 SMSMSSSSS 84.6 95.1
8 128 10000000 SSMSSSSSSS 67.7 98.7
8 192 11000000 SMSMSSSSSS 75.0 94.8
Table 3: Empirical results of recovering various LSBs from the spy program traces and
their corresponding SM sequences.
SMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMSSSMSSSSSSSMSSSSMSSSSSSSMSSSSSSM
SSSSSSMSSSSSSSSMSSSMSSSSSSSSSSMSSSSSSSSMSSSSSMSSS
SSMSSSSSSSSSMSSSSSMSSSSSSMSSSSSMSSSSSSSMSSSSMSSSS
SSSMSSSSSSMSSSSMSSSSSSSSMSSSSSSSSMSSSMSSSSSSSMSSS
SSMSSSSSMSSSSMSSSSSSMSSSMSSSSSSMSSSSSSMSSMSSSSSSS
SSMSSSSMSSSSSSSSMSSSSSSSSSMSMSSSSSMSSSSSSSSSMSSSS
SSSSSSMSSSSM
Figure 15: Example of an extracted SM sequence, where S and M are square and multiply,
respectively.
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k to ensure that k¯ is of a fixed length. That is, k¯ = k + γq such that 2n ≤ k¯ < 2n + q
where n = dlg(q)e and γ ∈ {1, 2}.
The side-channel leaks information on bits of the exponent k¯ rather than directly on
the nonce. To create HNP instances from the leak we need to handle the unknown value
of γ. In previous works, due to ECC parameters the modulus is close to a power of two
hence the value of γ is virtually constant [7]. For DSA, the modulus is not close to a
power of two and the value of γ varies between signatures. The challenge is, therefore,
to construct an HNP instance without the knowledge of γ. We now show how to address
this challenge.
Recall that s = k−1(h(m)+αr) mod q. Equivalently, k = s−1(h(m)+αr) mod q. The
side-channel information recovers the ` LSBs of k¯. We, therefore, have k¯ = b2` + a where
a = k¯ mod 2` is known, and
2n−` ≤ b < 2n−` + ⌈q/2`⌉ . (1)
Following previous works we use b·cq to denote the reduction modulo q to the range
[0, q) and | · |q for the reduction modulo q to the range (−q/2, q/2). Within these ex-
pressions division operations are carried over the reals whereas all other operations are
carried over GF (q).
We now look at
⌊
b− 2n−`⌋
q
.⌊
b− 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
(k¯ − a) · 2−` − 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
k¯ · 2−` − a · 2−` − 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
k · 2−` + γ · q · 2−` − a · 2−` − 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
k · 2−` − a · 2−` − 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
(s−1 · (h(m) + α · r) · 2−` − a · 2−` − 2n−`⌋
q
=
⌊
α · s−1 · r · 2−` − (2n + a− s−1 · h(m)) · 2−`⌋
q
Hence, we can set:
t =
⌊
s−1 · r · 2−`⌋
q
u =
⌊
(2n + a− s−1 · h(m)) · 2−` +
⌈ q
2`+1
⌉⌋
q
v = |α · t− u|q
and by (1) we have |v| ≤ ⌈q/2`+1⌉.
Out of the HNP instances we generate, we select at random 49 for the SSH attack,
130 for the TLS attack and construct a lattice as described in Section 3.2.2. We solve
the CVP problem with a Sage script, performing lattice reduction using BKZ [45], and
enumerate the lattice points using Babai’s Nearest Plane (NP) algorithm [5]. We apply
two different techniques to extend NP to a larger search space. First, we take different
rounding paths to explore 210 different solutions in the tree paths [33, Sec. 4]. Second,
we use a randomization technique [34, Sec. 3.5] and shuffle the rows of B between lattice
reductions. We repeat with a different random selection of instances until we find the
private key.
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6 Results
We implemented the attack and evaluated it against the two protocols, SSH with 1024/160-
bit DSA and TLS with 2048/256-bit DSA. Table 4 contains the results. For both protocols
we only utilize traces with ` ≥ 3. With this value we experimentally found that we require
49 such signatures for SSH and 130 for TLS in order to achieve a reasonable probability
of solving the resulting CVP.
Victim OpenSSH (SSH) stunnel (TLS)
Key size 1024/160-bit 2048/256-bit
Handshakes 260 580
Lattice size 50 131
Set size 70.8 158.1
Errors 2.1 1.7
Iterations 13 22
CPU minutes 5.9 38.8
Success rate (%) 100.0 100.0
Table 4: Empirical lattice attack results over a thousand trials. Set size and errors are
mean values. Iterations and CPU time are median values.
Because the nonces are chosen uniformly at random, only about one in every four
signatures has an ` that we can utilize. To gather enough signatures and to compensate
for possible trace errors, we collect 580 SM sequences from TLS handshakes and 260 from
SSH.
On average, these collected sequences yield 70.8 (SSH) and 158.1 (TLS) traces with
` ≥ 3. Comparing the traces to the ground truth, we know that on average less than 3
have trace errors. However, because an adversary cannot check against the ground truth,
we leave these erroneous traces in the set and use them in the attack. We note that due
to the smaller key size in SSH, trace errors are much more prevalent there.
We construct a lattice from a random selection of the collected traces and attempt to
solve the resulting CVP. Due to the presence of the error traces there is a non-negligible
probability that our selected set contains an error. Furthermore, even if all the chosen
traces are correct, the algorithm may fail to find the target solution due to the heuristic
nature of lattice techniques. In case of failure, we repeat the process with a new random
selection from the same set. We need to execute a median value of 13 iterations for SSH
and 22 for TLS until we find the target solution.
As seen from Table 4, repeating our experiment over a thousand trials on a cluster
with hundreds of nodes, mixed between Intel X5660 and AMD Opteron 2435 cores, we
find the private key in all cases requiring a median 5.9 CPU minutes for the SSH key and
38.8 CPU minutes for the TLS key. Although we executed each trial on a single core,
in reality the iterations are independent of each other—the lattice attack is ridiculously
parallel.
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7 Discussion
Finding and exploiting a cache-timing attack requires a lot of work but additional work
needs to be done a posteriori. Section 7.1 explains some of the challenges abstracted
from the experimentation that should be consider during a real life attack under a more
chaotic setting where a system is running hundreds of processes at a given time. Sec-
tion 7.2 explains some techniques recommended to mitigate cache-timing techniques and
cache-timing attacks in general, hardware-based and software-based solutions are men-
tioned. And finally, Section 7.3 discusses some observations made during the responsible
disclosure process.
7.1 Challenges
Performing a cache-timing attack is not a trivial task to do and it is a complex engi-
neering problem as it is a complicated mathematical and cryptographic problem. Several
challenges during the the experiments were faced and some of those challenges were ab-
stracted for demonstration purposes. Some of those challenges are:
• Obtaining the memory addresses of the algorithm operations to be probed by an
attacker—e.g. square and multiply for DSA’s SWE algorithm, requires reverse engi-
neering skills. Reverse engineering allows to extract the addresses from the shared
library because, typically, debugging symbols are not loaded during execution time.
A way to simplify this task for an attacker is to compute the offset for each memory
address from the base memory address of the shared library. Using this approach
has two purposes: (a) during the reverse engineering step, an attacker only has to
find the base memory address and (b) even if memory randomization techniques
are used the offset is the same, thus, an attacker only cares about the base memory
address.
• Synchronization of the spy process and the victim process is easy during experi-
mentation but during an actual attack is not always possible to synchronize both
processes. Therefore, the spy process has to execute on the background and is the
attacker’s job to find the beginning and the end of every recorded cryptographic
operation in the side-channel trace.
• Having access to the target machine is not a strong assumption, the SSH attack
in Section 5.3.2 demonstrated this. Nowadays having legitimate access to target
machines is easier thanks to cloud computing and virtualization.
7.2 Mitigation
The techniques presented in this work are some of the techniques currently in use for
cache-timing attacks. The cache-timing attack described in Chapter 5 is a real threat
against systems and users working with DSA as a digital signature algorithm for au-
thentication within the TLS and the SSH protocols. Mitigating the attack in this work,
cache-timing techniques and ultimately cache-timing attacks is extremely relevant to the
security of Internet.
Fixing DSA is desirable and the fix is trivial once the software defect is detected, how-
ever, this does not address the general issue of preventing cache-timing attacks, specially
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cache-timing attacks based on the Flush+Reload technique. The Flush+Reload
technique relies on four basic factors to successfully implement a cache-timing attack and
some of these factors are shared with the performance degradation technique since it is
based on the Flush+Reload technique. The four basic factors are: (1) sensitive data
is recoverable from memory access patterns, (2) the spy process and the victim process
share the LLC memory, (3) a high-accuracy clock is available to the spy process and (4)
the lack of permission checks for using the clflush instruction. Preventing some of the
factors block the techniques and therefore the cache-timing attacks depending on these
techniques do not work anymore.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, clflush is an instruction that does not require elevated
privileges to execute. A logical solution is to restrict the access of the clflush instruction
to certain memory pages. Additionally, restrict the use of the clflush instruction to
memory pages where the process using it has write access — e.g. the spy process. Yarom
and Falkner [52] mention that AMD is not vulnerable to the Flush+Reload technique
due to their non-inclusive caches. In AMD processors, evicting data from the LLC does
not, necessarily, evicts the data from the L1 or L2 caches. Also, the ARM [8] architecture
is not vulnerable to the Flush+Reload technique thanks to the restricted use of the
command to evict memory lines.
Eliminating the use of the rdtsc command from the microprocessors is not possible
but it is possible to introduce noise or reduce the accuracy of the clock using fuzzy time
techniques [28]. However this approach does not completely solve the problem and it
has an impact on benign applications that require access to a high-resolution timer. An
attacker can start its own clock process in parallel or it can use the network as a clock.
Hardware based solutions require a considerable amount of money and time. Devel-
oping and adoption could take a long time, furthermore, these solutions do not protect
existing hardware, thus, software-based solutions are required to fix the problem and
impact as many affected devices as possible.
The easiest and fastest software-based solution to mitigate the attack proposed in
this work is fixing OpenSSL’s DSA. Fixing the software defect explained in Section 5.1 is
an immediate countermeasure to this attack, since this fix allows the code to execute a
constant-time implementation of the SWE algorithm. And as mentioned in Section 5.1,
the constant-time implementation of the SWE algorithm uses a fixed-window and masks
table access to the multipliers using the scatter-gather method [12, 53].
Intuitive software-based solutions include partially or fully disabling caching. Dis-
abling caching completely prevents cache-timing attacks, nevertheless this approach was
studied by Acıic¸mez et al. [1] and proved to have an immense performance impact on
both, the cryptographic process and on the system. A similar performance impact is ob-
served if the cache is flushed periodically—similar to what the performance degradation
technique does.
7.3 Disclosure of the Attack
Following good practices and responsible disclosure, the vulnerability found during this
work was reported to the open source projects OpenSSL, LibreSSL and BoringSSL.
OpenSSL is issuing a security advisory and they have assigned the CVE-2016-2178, the
rest of the parties involved were very proactive to fix the vulnerability. Additionally, the
vulnerability was reported to OpenSSH because the main goal of the SSH protocol is to
provide remote legitimate access to a system and the attack presented in Section 5.3.2
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represents a realistic scenario where an attacker does not require elevated privileges to
exploit it.
At the same time that the security vulnerability was reported, two patches were
proposed to fix it. The two versions of the patch were submitted to prevent future
code changes that may re-introduce the possibility of a cache-timing attack. At the
end OpenSSL chose one of the patches. The patch was applied on 6th of June 2016 by
OpenSSL13 and LibreSSL14. DSA is deprecated in OpenSSH but it is still widely used.
OpenSSH admitted that it is only possible for them to advise users not to use or re-enable
deprecated features but ultimately the decision is up to the users.
13-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
14-https://github.com/libressl-portable/openbsd/commit/075f24fcf49c54c48e55cd724e413880ebaffba6
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8 Conclusions
A simple software defect introduced in the DSA implementation in OpenSSL led to a
critical security vulnerability exploited in this work. This vulnerability not only allowed
to exploit OpenSSL but also to mount end-to-end attacks against fundamental Internet
protocols: SSH (via OpenSSH) and TLS (via stunnel).
The contributions in this work are summarized as follows:
• Introduction to digital signatures, the DSA algorithm and the SWE algorithm used.
• Explanation of common cache-timing techniques used to perform cache-timing at-
tacks and cache-timing data analysis against vulnerable algorithms running in non-
constant time.
• Identification of a security weakness in OpenSSL which fails to use a side-channel
safe implementation when performing DSA signatures.
• Description of how to use a combination of the Flush+Reload technique with
a performance-degradation attack to leak information from the unsafe SWE algo-
rithm.
• Presentation of the first key-recovery cache-timing attack on the TLS and SSH
cryptographic protocols.
• Recovery of DSA’s secret key by constructing and solving a lattice problem with
the side-channel information, the digital signatures and messages.
As can be seen, applied cryptography requires extreme attention to detail and special
care during design and implementation. Some technical advice regarding this vulnerabil-
ity to the users:
• OpenSSH supports building without OpenSSL as a dependency. It is recommend
that OpenSSH package maintainers switch to this option.
• OpenSSH administrators and users are recommended to migrate to ssh-ed25519
key types, the implementation of which has many desirable side-channel resistance
properties. Furthermore, ensure that ssh-dss is absent from the HostKeyAlgorithms
configuration field, and any such HostKey entries removed.
• OpenSSH administrators and users are recommended to disable cipher suites that
have DSA functionality as a pre-requisite.
8.1 Future work
The cache-timing attack on OpenSSL’s DSA implementation and the results obtained
from the experiments were positive and successful. The analysis presented here is far
from being exhaustive. Although a fix was proposed and applied by the open source
community, code verification is still required. DSA’s constant-time SWE algorithm was
implemented back in 2005 but it has not been tested against cache-timing attacks using
current cache-timing techniques because the software defect explained in this work pre-
vented the constant-time code from running. The constant-time implementation might
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provide enough side-channel information to mount a new cache-timing attack, recovering
the secret key.
Furthermore, this work focused in one particular implementation of digital signatures
— DSA, additional cryptographic primitives need to be verified to be safe against the
techniques discussed here.
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A First appendix
Figures 16, 17 and 18 show the patches submitted to OpenSSL, LibreSSL and BoringSSL
respectively.
From 690706448bfecb1c73e8ff320d6289bd55370c04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
---
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index ce1da1c..beb62b2 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -204,10 +204,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(k));
- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
- BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
-
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
@@ -238,6 +234,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
} else {
K = k;
}
+
+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
--
1.7.9.5
Figure 16: Patch submitted to OpenSSL fixing the software defect in
crypto/dsa/dsa ossl.c.
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From a0014f43a682c11e0002ed12ae361da61f2270e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 10:27:42 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2016-2178
---
src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index b3eefcc..cb6be55 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(&k));
- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
@@ -283,6 +280,15 @@ dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
} else {
K = &k;
}
+
+ /* Fix for CVE-2016-2178
+ * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag should occur immediately before
+ * the exponentiation code.
+ */
+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+
DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p);
if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx))
--
1.7.9.5
Figure 17: Patch submitted to LibreSSL fixing the software defect in
crypto/dsa/dsa ossl.c.
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From 8593061ae8f4b6b2f4cd0fad03be3e5eabdda7e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
Date: Fri, 27 May 2016 09:53:09 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2016-2178
---
crypto/dsa/dsa.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa.c
index fe29aa0..6eca7c5 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa.c
@@ -819,8 +819,6 @@ int DSA_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
}
} while (BN_is_zero(&k));
- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
(CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_p_lock, dsa->p,
ctx)) {
@@ -847,6 +845,12 @@ int DSA_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
K = &kq;
+ /* Fix for CVE-2016-2178
+ * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag should occur immediately before
+ * the exponentiation code.
+ */
+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p)) {
goto err;
}
--
1.7.9.5
Figure 18: Patch submitted to BoringSSL fixing the software defect in
crypto/dsa/dsa.c.
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